

1600 South Second Street Mount Vernon, WA 98273-5202 ph 360.428.1617 fax 360.428.1620 www.nwcleanair.org

Air Operating Permit Excess Emissions Report Form Part II

Name of Facility	Snell, Puget Sound Refinery	Reported by		Tim Figgie	
Date of notification	October 15, 2010	Incident type breakdown/ or shutdown	upset/startup	Breakdown	
Start Date	October 15, 2010	Start Time:		9:00 AM	
End Date	October 15, 2010	End Time:		10:00 AM	
Process unit or system(s): Flare					
Incident Description					
On October 15, 2010 at approximately 8:45 AM the DCU blowdown recovery compressor (15K100) shutdown due to mechanical problems. During the coker blowdown the main flare					
header pressured up with the blowdown compressor out of service. Prior to starting the					
blowdown cycle Operations started additional flare gas recovery (FGR) compressors but the					
blowdown flow still pressured into the flare heater resulting in high sulfur gas to the flare.					
To prevent a reoccurrence, Operations staff was informed of the importance of slowly venting during blowdown and allowing time for FGR compressors to kick on to keep the Flare system in control if K100 is					
running or down.					
Immediate steps taken to limit the duration and/or quantity of excess emissions:					
The Flare Gas Recover	y unit was operating	and recovering	as much excess	s gas as possible.	
Applicable air operating permit 4.10 and 4.11					
Applicable air operating permit 4.10 and 4.11 term(s):					
Land of the land o					
Estimated Excess Emis	sions: Pollutar	it(s):	Pounds (Estin	Pounds (Estimate):	
Based on SO2 CEMS and cal	SO2		104		
stack flow	culaceu				
The incident was the		/ - - -			
The incident was the result of the following (check all that apply): Scheduled equipment startup					
Scheduled equipment startup Scheduled equipment shutdown					
Poor or inadequate design					
Careless, poor, or inadequate operation					
Poor or inadequate maintenance					
A reasonably preventable condition					
Did the facility receive any complaints from the public?					
No No					
Yes (provide details below)					
Did the incident result in the violation of an ambient air quality standard					
No No					
Yes (provide details below)					

Root and other contributing causes of incident:

Air Operating Permit Excess Emissions Report Form Part II Page 2

The root cause of the incident was a mechanical failure of 15K100, the DCU blowdown.
The root cause of the incident was:
(The retention of records of all required monitoring data and support information shall be kept for a period of five years
from the date of the report as per the WAC regulation (173-401-615))
Identified for the first time
☐ Identified as a recurrence (explain previous incident(s) below – provide dates)
A similar event occurred on July 20, 2010.
Are the emissions from the incident exempted by the NSPS or NESHAP "malfunction" definitions
below?
Yes (describe below)
The root cause of the incident was a
<u>Definition of NSPS "Malfunction"</u> : Any sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of air pollution control
equipment, process equipment, or failure of a process to operate in a normal or usual manner. Failures that are caused
in part by poor maintenance or careless operation are not malfunctions. 40 CFR 60.2
Definition of NESHAP "Malfunction": Any sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of air pollution
control and monitoring equipment, process equipment, or a process to operate in a normal or usual manner which
causes, or has the potential to cause, the emission limitations in an applicable standard to be exceeded. Failures that
are caused in part by poor maintenance or careless operation are not malfunctions. 40 CFR 63.2
Applyons of managers available to reduce likelihood of requirence (evaluate possible design
Analyses of measures available to reduce likelihood of recurrence (evaluate possible design,
operational, and maintenance changes; discuss alternatives, probable effectiveness, and cost;
determine if an outside consultant should be retained to assist with analyses):
To prevent a reoccurrence, Operations staff was informed of the importance of slowly venting during
blowdown and allowing time for FGR compressors to kick on to keep the Flare system in control if K100 is
running or down.
Description of corrective action to be taken (include commencement and completion dates):
See above
andra i area de la Maderia de Servicio de 187
If correction not required, explain basis for conclusion:
See above
Attach Reports, Reference Documents, and Other Backup Material as Necessary. This report satisfies the requirements of
both NWCAA regulation 340, 341, 342 and the WAC regulation (173-400-107).
Is the investigation continuing? $oxedsymbol{oxtime}$ No $oxedsymbol{\Box}$ Yes
Is the source requesting additional time for completion of the report? $oxtime{oxtime}$ No $oxtime{oxdot}$ Yes
Based upon information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, I certify that the statements and
information in this document and all referenced documents and attachments are true, accurate and
complete.
Prepared By: _ Jason Smolsnik Date:October 20, 2010
Responsible Official or Designee: Date: 11/30/10
FOL SGE